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and that it might make for a stronger argument to clarify
the terminology and make appropriate distinctions. This
Lynch does do to some extent; I would push this further.
The use of the term "unconscious" (or, again, "non
conscious") in many of the ways utilized by the Cartesian
arguers trades on an equivocation between a sort of
Freudian sense of the term (as in the sort of notion that
one unconsciously hates one's sibling when one cannot
articulate it), and a more full-blooded sense of me term
which has the implication that one is unconscious only
when one is asleep, in a coma or suffering from a head
injury. The difficulty with the Cartesian arguments is that
mey trade on these uses of the term, and do so rather
shamelessly. Lynch notes this when he states mat
"....Carruthers confuses being conscious of something
with paying attention to something of which one is
already conscious." Again, I would push mis line of
argument further, since it is clear that the uses of me
terms "conscious" and "unconscious" are crucial to
Carruthers' and Harrison's arguments. One cannot be said
to be driving "unconsciously." An unconscious individual
cannot drive. Since driving does not, presumably, often
evoke me sorts of trauma-generated conflicts of which
me Freudians speak, it makes little sense to mink mat
there are (in most cases) unconscious defense
mechanisms that prevent one's paying attention to the
freeway exit when one is driving. Although me English
language perhaps lacks a vocabulary adequate to a full
description of mese activities, much of routine driving is
best captured, I argue, by expressions such as "semi
conscious" or "not fully aware." Thus I substantiate
Lynch's claim mat the Cartesians are misusing tl1ese
terms; I simply want also to assert that this constitutes a
ratl1er grave level ofmisuse and is, in fact, an instance of
an informal fallacy.
Oddly enough, as Lynch also notes, there is some
sense actually attachable to tl1e notion of "unconscious
pain." I would flesh out this assertion by suggesting
tllat tl1e best tRke on this would probably be something
along the lines of the autonomic responses in which
the nervous system engages when a patient is
anestl1etized for surgery, and so forth. Thus me headache
example, as constructed, is clearly not an "unconscious
headache." When one is distracted from one's headache,
one cannot be said to be unconscious, nor can me
headache ever completely disappear from one's level
of awareness. All of mis bolsters Lynch's contention
that " .. .it is normally difficult to account for pain
behavior in tl1e absence of tl1e experience of pain."
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In "Is Animal Pain Conscious?," Joseph Lynch sustains
the thesis that animals feel pain and aptly counters the
contentions of Carrutllers and Harrison that they do not.
Since I am in broad agreement with Prof. Lynch's
clearly argued paper, I will confine myself to some
comments on me positions of Carruthers and Harrison,
and a small modification to Prof. Lynch's argument.
Joseph Lynch rightly attacks the uses of the terms
"conscious" and "unconscious" (or "non-conscious" in
Carruthers' case) by both Cartesian authors, and it is to
this area of the controversy that I wish to tum. Lynch
notes, for example, that "Carruthers' account [demands
that] ... conscious states must be available for thought,
every conscious state requires higher-order intentional
mentality. And Carruthers takes it as axiomatic that
animals could neither have beliefs or thoughts about
their experience." Lynch then goes on to claim-again,
correctly, I believe-that "[t]heir [Carruthers' and
Harrison's] arguments depend largely upon moving
from the conceivability of some unconscious pain to
the claim that animal pain in general must be
unconscious. But the mere possibility that we can
account for some pain as a type of unconscious
perception is not sufficient to establish that animal pain
is most plausibly interpreted in this way." Lynch's
strategy is to show that Harrison and Carrutllers are
wrong by pointing out that the arguments in favor of
the notion that animals do experience pain are,
collectively and cumulatively quite strong, even if none
of them is as strong individually as we might like.
While agreeing with Prof. Lynch, my contention is
that he is a bit too ready to accept the rather odd use of
terminology in which Carruthers and Harrison indulge,
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Most importantly, perhaps, I agree with Lynch on
the use of the notion of "second-order state" as an index
of consciousness, and again I feel that, if anything,
Prof. Lynch has been too generous to his opponents.
There seems to be a profound speciesism involved in
this talk of higher-order states, since it is clear that the
capacity for what we normally count as such states is
indeed related to the capacity for language. Part of
what has made the claims about the great apes'
linguistic abilities controversial to some is the notion
that an ape such as Koko could pun or engage in
activities that require a generalization over signs rather
than an attempt to link a sign to a signified.(Penny
Patterson of Stanford has reported that Koko has the
ability to engage in a number of meta-linguistic
activities.) Lynch acknowledges this when he says that
"Carruthers shares a widely held philosophical opinion
that the capacity to think is dependent upon the capacity
to use language." The strongest counter to the notion
that consciousness must be defined in terms of the
capacity for second-order thought in some way that we
would ordinarily call biconditional comes from our
observations of the behavior of infants and very small
children. Here few adult humans would deny the
attribution of consciousness, even though it is clear,
because of the lack of language use, that it makes little
sense to attribute sophisticated levels of intentionality.
Thus the same kinds of considerations that cause
concern for the thirteen-month-old should cause
concern for our dog, even though neither, ex hypothesi,
holds second-order beliefs about the noxious
phenomena. Lynch asserts something similar when he
ends his paper by noting that" ... the writhing and
screams of a one-year-old child, or a lamb... " could
only be ignored by philosophers.
Carruthers and Harrison both make rather extreme
claims. Of the alleged non-conscious experience of
pain, Carruthers notes, "It feels like nothing."l He also
claims, as Lynch notes, that" ... conscious experiences
are those which are available to conscious thinkings."2
Harrison actually goes so far as to say that "Properly
programmed, such a machine [a robot] would manifest
its own pain behavior."3
In general, then, I support Prof. Lynch in both of his
major lines of counterargument, while contending that
each line can be bolstered and each major strand made
to do more damage. The blatant misuse of terms having
to do with mental states by both of the Cartesian authors
constitutes a deliberate instance of equivocation-the
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misuse of the terms is obvious, whether one takes them
to be used in the colloquial, ordinary-language sense,
or in some more recondite and technical sense. The
contention, following along with the assertions made
by some in philosophy of mind, that a conscious state
must be the object of some second-order intentional
state if it is to count as conscious, could only have been
made by the language-intoxicated and runs counter to
our everyday experience of life, not only with respect
to nonhumans but with respect to small humans as well.
Animals, young humans and those who lack language
should indeed be objects of our moral concern. Another
level of concern should be expressed for those who
abuse terminology.
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